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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

The Right to Food Under Hugo Chávez
Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann*
Abstract
This article investigates the right to food in Venezuela under President
Hugo Chávez (1999–2013). Although Chávez respected Venezuelans’
right to food, he failed to protect it. In the short term, he fulfilled the right
to food by establishing state-run stores where food was sold cheaply, and
by imposing price controls. At the same time, he reduced the food supply
by undermining property rights, expropriating large-scale ranches as well
as wholesale and retail distributors. Violations of civil and political rights
made it difficult for Chávez’s critics to oppose his food policies. By the
time Chávez died food shortages were extremely severe.

I.

The Human Right to Food

This article discusses the right to food in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez.
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that “[e]
veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food.”1 Two international
covenants codify the declared ideals of the UDHR into international law;
*			Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann is Canada Research Chair in International Human Rights at
Wilfrid Laurier University and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. Her most recent
books include Can Globalization Promote Human Rights? (2010) and her co-edited The
Human Rights to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept (2015). She maintains a blog, Rights and
Rightlessness, which can be accessed at http://rhodahassmann.blogspot.com. This article is
part of her current research on state food crimes.
				
Dr. Howard-Hassmann thanks Antulio Rosales for his research assistance and comments
for this article, as well as Javier Corrales, Francisco López-Bermudez, Kathryn Hochstetler,
Ken Jackson, and Yehonatan Alsheh for their comments on earlier drafts. She also thanks
the Canada Research Chairs program for the time and funds to write this article, and Wilfrid
Laurier University for nominating her for her Chair.
		 1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess, art. 25(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948).
Human Rights Quarterly 37 (2015) 1024–1045 © 2015 by Johns Hopkins University Press
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these are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)2
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).3 The ICESCR includes the rights to adequate food and freedom
from hunger.4 Venezuela ratified both Covenants in 1978. Thus, it is bound
by treaty to respect the human right to food.
There are three aspects of the right to food: to respect, protect, and fulfill
it.5 President Hugo Chávez respected the right to food, attempted to fulfill
it, but failed to protect it. His policies from 1999 to 2013 were originally
intended to improve the access of the Venezuelan poor to food. He used
Venezuela’s oil wealth to establish food “missions” (misiones) that distributed free food to the poor, and set up state-owned markets (Mercals) that
sold food in poverty-stricken areas at subsidized prices.6 He also imposed
price controls on food. Thus, in the very short term he improved fulfillment
of Venezuelans’ right to food. During the later years of Chávez’ tenure as
president, however, he failed to protect the right to food: shortages became
more and more common. Chávez’ economic mismanagement suggested
that if his policies were not remedied, food would become ever scarcer, as
indeed it did under his successor, Nicolás Maduro.
II.	Background
From 1958 to 1998 Venezuela was ruled by an elite pact7 that allowed
the major political parties to alternate power and also accommodate the
interests of minor political parties; while it was based particularly in the
middle classes, the pact also accommodated the interests of other social
groups such as organized labor, the church, business people, and the armed
forces.8 The pact’s economic basis lay in “clientelistic distribution of the
petroleum income.”9
		 2.
		 3.
		4.
		 5.
		6.
		7.

		8.
		9.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S.
3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976).
Id. art. 11(1), (2).
Philip Alston & Asbjørn Eide, Advancing the Right to Food in International Law, in Food
as a Human Right 160, 252–56 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1984).
Richard Gott, Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution 239, 256–59 (2011); Bart Jones,
Hugo! The Hugo Chavez Story from Mud Hut to Perpetual Revolution 394, 394–95 (2007).
Miriam Kornblith, Sowing Democracy in Venezuela: Advances and Challenges in a
Time of Change, in State and Society in Conflict: Comparative Perspectives on Andean Crises
290, 290 (Paul W. Drake & Eric Hershberg eds., 2006); Janet Kelly & Pedro A. Palma,
The Syndrome of Economic Decline and the Quest for Change, in The Unraveling of
Representative Democracy in Venezuela 204, 204 (Jennifer L. McCoy & David J. Myers eds.,
2004).
Rafael Duarte Villa, Venezuela: Political Changes in the Chavez Era, 21 Estudos Avancados
153 (2007).
Id. at 154.
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The pact encountered trouble in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1983, currency
devaluation ushered in a period of social and economic decline in which
poverty rates rose.10 That same year witnessed an end to the “petro-bonanza,”
or the high price of oil that had started in 1973 and had permitted government elites to dispense benefits to their supporters.11 The period 1987 to
1998 was characterized by a drop in income per capita, a rise in inflation,
currency depreciation, and a boom-and-bust economy that followed fluctuations in oil prices.12 In 1989, a shortage of basic foodstuffs, along with an
increase in the price of gasoline, caused riots in Caracas, in which 300 to
1,000 people were killed.13 During the 1990s economic decline, increased
unemployment and high rates of poverty continued.14 By 1998 between
two thirds and three quarters of Venezuelans lived below the poverty line.15
In 1999, the purchasing power of the average Venezuelan salary was only
about 33 percent of what it had been in 1978.16
Thus, the Venezuelan economy was in a state of collapse before Chávez
took power. Moreover, if Chávez mismanaged the economy and undermined
long-term food security, his was certainly not the first Venezuelan government
to do so. Below I discuss the detrimental effects of dual exchange rates and
price controls on the food supply under Chávez’ rule, but governments in
the 1980s also instituted such policies.17 Chávez was not the first president
to rely on oil rents to pay for government expenditures, rather than trying
to encourage a more efficient economy.18
In 1992, Chávez, then a member of the military, attempted a coup
d’état. The coup failed and he subsequently spent two years in jail; on his
release, he established a mass political movement, the Movement of the Fifth
Republic (referring to the Republic as it would become under his rule). In
1998, he successfully ran for president, receiving 58 percent of the vote.19
In 2002, Chávez defeated an attempted coup by middle-class and military
elements. He won a recall referendum in 2004 and was re-elected president
in 2006 and 2012. He died of cancer on 5 March 2013.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Kornblith, supra note 7, at 291.
David J. Myers, Venezuela: Delegative Democracy or Electoral Autocracy? in Constructing
Democratic Governance in Latin America 285, 290 (Jorge I. Dominguez & Michael Shifter,
eds., 3d ed. 2008).
Kelly & Palma, supra note 7, at 206–18.
Duarte Villa, supra note 8, at 157.
Kornblith, supra note 7, at 298.
Myers, supra note 11, at 288; Michael Shifter, In Search of Hugo Chavez, 85 Foreign
Aff. 45, 47 (2006).
Kelly & Palma, supra note 7, at 207.
Roberto Briceno-Leon, Petroleum and Democracy in Venezuela, 84 Soc. Forces 1, 10
(2005).
Id. at 3–4.
Duarte Villa, supra note 8, at 160.
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Many commentators consider Chávez to have been a populist leader.20
Populist political leaders appeal to the underprivileged masses; often this
appeal relies on a perceived personal relationship between a charismatic
leader and his followers rather than on an explicit policy platform.21 This
appears to have been the case in Venezuela, where Chávez did not rely on
an organized political party but rather on his own identification with the
poor and his self-portrayal as a man of the masses, an identification made
all the stronger because he was of non-European descent, as opposed to the
white elite.22 Chávez also exemplified economic populism, relying on “the
creation of a material base for the public’s support and the distribution of
favors to constituents,” while ignoring resource constraints.23 But Chávez also
relied on support from the military, from which he himself had emerged:24
members or former members of the military occupied many positions in
government and the nationalized sectors of the economy.25
By the end of Chávez’ tenure, the poor did not automatically support
him, as many were fed up not only with food shortages but also with the
corruption and nepotism that characterized his rule. Only in 1998 were
the poor more likely to vote for Chávez than other income groups, though
throughout his tenure the rich were disproportionately unlikely to vote for
him.26 Chávez remained in power by a combination of genuine support from
some of the poor, policies such as cheap gas and expanded state employment
that benefited the middle classes as well as the poor,27 and a good dose of
electoral chicanery.28 Chávez won every election in which he ran from 1998
to 2012, although he lost a 2007 referendum on constitutional amendments.
III. The Right to Food in Venezuela
Scholarly evaluations of Chávez’ record as president are mixed; some focus
on the good he did for Venezuela’s poor while others emphasize the harm
he caused to the economy. Those who praise him mention in particular his
food policies. Chávez established the Mercals, or special people’s markets,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Jorge G. Castañeda, Latin America’s Left Turn. 85 Foreign Aff. 28, 38–42 (2006).
Richard Sandbrook, Mark Edelman, Patrick Heller, & Judith Teichman, Social Democracy in the
Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects 28 (2007).
Gott, supra note 6, at 239.
Ana Lucia Cordova Cazar & Francisco Lopez-Bermudez, Latin American Populism, in
Encyclopedia of Hum. Rts. Vol. 3, at 401 (David P. Forsythe, ed. 2009).
Kornblith, supra note 7, at 311.
Briceno-Leon, supra note 17, at 19.
Noam Lupu Who Votes for Chavismo? Class Voting in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, 45
Latin Am. Res. Rev. 7, 23 (2010).
Javier Corrales, Explaining Chavismo: The Unexpected Alliance of Radical Leftists and the Military
in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez 32 (2010).
Javier Corrales, A Setback for Chavez, 22 J. Democ 122 (2011).
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where a large range of subsidized goods could be purchased. By 2007,
about 9.3 million people (out of a total population of about 28 million)
shopped for food at the Mercals.29 The missions also distributed free, readyto-eat foods to the very poor.30 The free food was distributed to groups of
neighborhood women who cooked hot lunches for the extremely poor in
their own kitchens.31
By 2006 almost 16,000 stores throughout Venezuela offered subsidized
food at about 27 to 39 percent less than market prices.32 Moreover, as of
2008, 3.9 million children benefited from a school food program,33 against
only 252,000 children in 199934; children were given breakfast, lunch, and
an afternoon snack.35 However, food shortages started to appear as early as
2007. Even two very pro-Chávez observers noted that “[i]n recent months
there have been reports of shortages of foods such as beef, sugar, corn oil,
milk, chicken and eggs.”36 By late 2007 other basic foodstuffs such as sardines and black beans were increasingly scarce.37
These shortages were caused by a combination of price controls and
the rapid growth of consumption, along with some hoarding of goods.38
Food producers lacked incentives to produce and sell at control prices
that were less than the cost of production. By 2008 a “steep drop in food
production and widening food scarcity” resulted from price and exchange
controls and threats to expropriate property by Chávez. These policies will
be discussed below.39
Prices of non-controlled goods rose as producers tried to compensate for
their losses on controlled goods, while demand for non-controlled goods rose
as a reaction against shortages in the controlled sector. For example, some
dairy producers substituted non-controlled cheese for controlled milk; one
rice-processing plant started to sell non-controlled flavored rice.40 The sale
of food at control prices also opened up opportunities to exploit the dual
price system, as entrepreneurs could buy food at Mercals and then resell it,
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Michael Penfold-Becerra, Clientelism and Social Funds: Evidence from Chavez’s Missions, 49 Latin Am. Pol. & Soc’y 63, 74 (2007).
Duarte Villa, supra note 8, at 166.
Jones, supra note 6, at 395.
Mark Weisbrot & Luis Sandoval, The Venezuelan Economy in the Chavez Years, Center
for Economic and Policy Research 2–3 (2007).
Mark Weisbrot, Poverty Reduction in Venezuela: A Reality-Based View, 8 ReVista: Harvard
Rev. Latin Am. 1, 6 (2008).
Weisbrot & Sandoval, supra note 32, at 9.
Terry Gibbs, Business as Usual: What the Chavez Era Tells Us about Democracy under
Globalisation 27 Third World Q. 265, 274 (2006).
Weisbrot & Sandoval, supra note 32, at 17.
Francisco Rodriguez, An Empty Revolution: the Unfulfilled Promises of Hugo Chávez,
87 Foreign Aff. 49, 56 (2008).
Weisbrot & Sandoval, supra note 32, at 16.
Rodriguez, supra note 37, at 57.
Feeding Frenzy: Socialism in Venezuela, Economist, 14 Mar. 2009, at 40.
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illegally, at higher prices; or managers of Mercals could simply steal from
inventory and sell the food at home or abroad.41 This method of exploiting
the dual price system was especially lucrative because of the shortage of
food at the Mercals. Prices of non-subsidized and non-controlled foods also
rose drastically as a consequence of inflation, averaging about 22 percent
annually from 2003 to 2011.42 In order to combat inflation, Chávez ordered
controls on more and more items, so that by 2012 the prices of hundreds
of staple foods were controlled.43
The more goods that were controlled, the higher the prices on the black,
or informal, market became when goods could not be found at the Mercals.
Thus, in a vicious spiral, price controls encouraged higher black market
prices, which in turn resulted in more controlled prices and more shortages.
In January 2013, the Venezuelan Central Bank reported that 78 percent of
retail establishments it had surveyed did not have enough sugar, while the
figures for other staple shortages were: 67 percent for vegetable oil, 57 percent
for corn oil, 86 percent for sunflower oil, 77 percent for wheat flour, and 43
percent for precooked corn.44 Over one year, from January 2011 to January
2012, the price of a kilogram of sugar rose from 87 cents to $2.56, while
the street price of a bottle of corn oil was over $4.50, three times the control
price of $1.40.45 In January 2013, 2.2 monthly salaries at minimum wage
were required to buy the monthly food basket.46 In addition, food was not
necessarily distributed equitably; rather, it was distributed on a clientelistic
basis either to neighborhoods that already supported Chávez,47 or whose
support Chávez hoped to obtain.48 Indeed, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights warned in 2009 that because mission policies appeared
to be “determined at the discretion of the executive branch” the impression
might be garnered that “some persons are not eligible for these benefits as
a result of their political position vis-à-vis the government.”49
Some observers maintain that the food missions were used as political tools to persuade people to vote for Chávez in a recall referendum in
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Javier Corrales & Carlos Romero, U.S.-Venezuela Relations Since the 1990s : Coping With
Mid-Level Security Threats (2013).
Mark Weisbrot & Jake Johnston, Venezuela’s Economic Recovery: Is It Sustainable?
Center for Economic and Policy Research 21 (2012).
Charlie Devereux, Venezuelan Inflation Slows Further as Chavez Eyes Votes, Bloomberg
News, 4 Sep. 2012.
DVA Group & Selinger Group, Venezuelan Daily Brief 9 (18 Jan. 2013), available at
http://venezuelandailybrief.blogspot.com/2013/01/caracas-january-18th-2013.html.
Fabiola Sanchez, Chavez’s Spending Could Boost Venezuelan Inflation, Assoc. Press 3
Jan. 2012.
DVA Group & Selinger Group, supra note 44, 15 Jan.
Penfold-Bacerra, supra note 29, at 78–79.
Manuel Hidalgo, Hugo Chavez’s “Petro-Socialism,” 20 J. Democ. 78, 81 (2009).
Organization of American States & Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Democracy
and Human Rights in Venezuela 267 (2009).
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2004, and in the 2006 and 2012 elections: for example, that during the
2006 election the missions allocated resources to “groups whose votes
President Chávez sought.”50 In the run-up to the 2012 election, Chávez
imposed controls on a far wider range of goods in an attempt to make sure
that the poor could buy them. Despite the shortages, the Mercals remained
extremely popular, and Chávez’ opponents promised to keep funding them
if they won the elections.51
Statistics on the right to food in Venezuela showed marked progress
from 1999 to 2010. The number of undernourished people fell from an estimated 4 million in 2000 to 1 million in 2010.52 In 2000, 27.1 percent of
the population was estimated to be without enough food for normal physical
activity, but by 2010 that figure had declined to 6.4 percent.53 The depth of
the food deficit (the number of calories per day per person needed to end
malnourishment) fell from 108 in 2000 to sixteen in 2010.54 The prevalence
of stunting, or child malnutrition, under age five as measured by height per
age, was 17.4 percent in 2000, but had decreased to 15.6 percent by 2007.55
The infant mortality rate declined from 19.6 per 1,000 in 1999 to 12.9 per
1,000 in 2011, while the under-five mortality rate declined from 23.1 per
1,000in 1999 to 15.6 in 2011.56
During the first few years of Chávez’ tenure the poverty rate rose as
a result of a temporary drop in the price of oil and destabilizing political
events, including the attempted coup d’état in 2002 and a protracted strike
by oil workers in 2002–2003. The percentage of people living below $1.25
per day rose from 11.4 in 1999 to 19 in 2003, and the percentage of people
living below the national poverty line rose from 48.7 in 1999 to 62 in 2003.
Later statistics, however, show a significant drop in poverty, reflecting Chávez’
consolidation of power, the recovery in the price of oil, and his creation of
social welfare missions. By 2006, the percentage of people living on $1.25
per day had fallen to 6.6, while the percentage living under the national
poverty rate had fallen to 36. By 2012, the national poverty rate had dropped
further, to 25.4 percent.57 The United Nations Human Development Index
(HDI), an aggregate of figures on health, education, and gross national income per capita, also demonstrated improvements in Venezuelans’ lives. In

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Myers, supra note 11, at 313.
Anne Daguerre, Antipoverty Programmes in Venezuela, 40 J. Soc. Pol’y 835, 843 (2011).
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Food Security Indicators VAO1 (2013), available at http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en/#.VZQA40aNq7Q.
Id. V15.
Id. V14.
Id. V16.
World Bank, Statistical Database (2013).
World Bank Statistical Database (2011), available at http://search.worldbank.org/data?q
term=Venezuela+poverty+rate+&language=&format=.
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this index the higher the number the better the standard of living. In 2000
Venezuela’s HDI was 0.662, but by 2012 it was 0.748.58
These statistics on food, health, and poverty suggest that Chávez’ food
policies contributed to better health and reduced poverty. Nevertheless,
these policies were not perfect, and in the latter years of Chávez’ rule the
policies contributed to significant food shortages. Yet it was difficult for
Venezuelans to criticize or vote against them, because of Chávez’ increasingly authoritarian rule.
IV. Civil and Political Rights
Populist claims to represent “the people” do not extend to standard liberal
forms of democratic rule. Rather, populist rulers tend to assume that once
they win democratic elections they have license to act as they see fit, abjuring legislative checks and balances, undermining the rule of law, and
violating those civil and political rights such as freedom of speech and press
that might allow their opponents to garner support. This was the pattern in
Venezuela under Chávez, who attempted to implement “twenty-first century
socialism” to reign in the excesses of “savage capitalism.”59 Yet without the
protections of civil and political rights mandated by the international human rights regime, citizens opposed to or adversely affected by government
policies cannot make their concerns known. This occurred in Venezuela, as
Chávez became increasingly dictatorial.
Chávez interpreted his electoral victories as mandates to institute
whatever policies he preferred, often ruling by emergency decree. He was
determined to carry through his twenty-first century socialism even in the
face of evidence that his policies were depriving the very people he wished
to help with food. Although he respected the principle of periodic elections,
he otherwise developed an increasingly autocratic system of rule. He intimidated or restricted the media, the judiciary, and ordinary voters.
Chávez’ many assaults on basic civil and political rights are too numerous to detail in this article; suffice it to say that his philosophy of popular
democracy did not include scrupulous attention to the civil and political
rights that are normally protected in liberal democracies. After the recall
referendum in 2004, a list of 2.5 million people who had signed the petition to recall Chávez was published, thus making known the names of his
opponents60; some citizens also complained that they had been denied state
benefits because they were known to have signed the petition.61 During
58.
59.
60.
61.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 144 (2013),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report.
Myers, supra note 11, at 285, 319.
Hidalgo, supra note 48, at 83.
Cristina Marcano & Alberto Barrera Tyszka, Hugo Chavez: The Definitive Biography of Venezuela’s
Controversial President 283 (2006).
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the 2006 election, Chávez’ supporters used public assets for his campaign
and the head of the national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)
threatened that workers who did not support Chávez would lose their jobs.62
On 2 December 2007, a proposal for constitutional amendments which,
among other provisions, would have given Chávez the right to be elected
president in perpetuity was barely defeated in a referendum.63 Chávez was
reputed to have expedited citizenship for between 2 and 3 million long-term
foreign residents so that they could vote for him.64 Chávez won a second
referendum to abolish term limits in 2009, in part by implying that those who
did not vote for him—especially government employees—would be guilty of
treason, and also threatening that civil war might result if he were no longer
president.65 By law Chávez could requisition television time whenever he
wanted for long, rambling speeches, yet his opponents were limited to three
minutes of television time per day.66 During the 2012 electoral campaign
Chávez again threatened a civil war if he did not win.67
Chávez also undermined the rule of law and the independence of the
judiciary. In 1999, a new constitution was promulgated that enabled Chávez
to rule by decree; by the end of 2000 he had issued forty-nine decrees.68 In
December 2004, the Supreme Court was expanded from twenty to thirtytwo members; this tipped the partisan balance in favor of the government,
as the twelve new judges were all Chávez’ political allies.69
Chávez instituted measures to undermine any interest group that he
perceived to be in opposition to his policies. Although he appointed many
members or former members of the military to his Cabinet and to various
other positions, he also attempted to replace or supplement the military with
a private militia that would be personally loyal to him. He did not entirely
trust the military after the attempted coup of 2002,70 By 2012, there were
125,000 members of this militia, providing an armed counterweight to the
ostensibly neutral national military.71 Chávez undermined trade union rights,
rejecting the principle of an autonomous labor movement and discharging
17,000 people belonging to the oil workers’ union after a series of strikes in
2002 to 2003.72 In their place, he fostered pro-government workers’ coun62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at xvii (Moises Naim, Introduction).
Myers, supra note 11, at 286.
Gott, supra note 6, at 261.
Chavez for Ever? Venezuela’s Term-Limits Referendum, Economist, 19 Feb. 2009, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/13145105.
Henrique and Hugoliath, Economist, 29 Sept. 2012, at 16.
Andrew Cawthorne, Venezuela’s Chavez Woos Rich, Warns of “Civil War,” Reuters, 10
Sept. 2012.
Duarte Villa, supra note 8, at 162.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) A Decade Under Chavez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela 3–4 (2008).
Shifter, supra note 15, at 49.
Venezuela’s Army: The Vote that Counts, Economist, 11 Aug. 2012, at 32.
Myers, supra note 11, at 306.
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cils.73 As early as 2009, scores of trade unionists were reported murdered
and dozens arrested.74
In general, Chávez engaged in political discrimination against his real
or perceived enemies, denying access to social programs to citizens he
perceived as opposing him and blacklisting and firing opponents from the
PDVSA and other state-run organizations.75 Human rights defenders were
intimidated, threatened, and assaulted.76 By 2012 there were reports of
torture, death threats, and assassinations, as well as politically-motivated
charges brought against Chávez’ opponents.77
Chávez also imposed controls on freedom of the press. He cancelled
licenses of opposition television stations,78 increased penalties for so-called
defamation, and expanded laws of contempt, thus pushing the media to
censor itself.79 He passed laws permitting the state to supervise the content
of the media and permitting imprisonment of any citizen showing “disrespect” to or supposedly insulting government officials.80 Judges supportive of
Chávez refused to accept decisions critical of the government by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights81 and in 2012 Venezuela withdrew from
that court as well as from other human rights organs of the Organization of
American States.82 These are only a few of the many actions Chávez took
that undermined the authority of the legislature, judiciary, and military, as
well as the media, trade unions, and civil society groups. Thus, he closed
off avenues that might have been able to point out to him how his policies
could adversely affect Venezuelans’ right to food. They might also have been
able to show him how his undermining of the right to own property had
adverse effects on the production and distribution of food.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

HRW, supra note 69, at 6–7.
Socialism v. Labour: Trade Unions in Venezuela, Economist, 9 May 2009, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/13611592.
HRW, supra note 69, at 2.
International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, Venezuela: Justice under Threat 3 (2007).
Amnesty International, (AI) Annual Report 2012: The State of the World’s Human Rights,
Venezuela 2 (2012).
Myers, supra note 11, at 304.
Jose Miguel Vivanco & Daniel Wilkinson, Hugo Chavez Versus Human Rights, 55 N.Y.
Rev. Books 68 (6 Nov. 2008).
HRW, supra note 69, at 4.
Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela: The Chavez Authoritarian Experiment 140 (2010).
Fabiola Sanchez, Venezuela to Pull out of OAS Human Rights Bodies. Assoc. Press, 26
July 2012, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/27/venezuela-pullout-oas-human-rights-bodies.html.
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V. Property Rights
From 2000 on, Chávez issued various decrees that “raised doubts about the
protection of private property” in Venezuela,83 despite the guarantee of the
right to property in Article 115 of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution.84 The
2001 Land Law permitted expropriation with compensation of idle, lowquality land from estates that owned a minimum of 5,000 hectares (12, 350
acres) of such land; in 2005 the amount was reduced to 3,000 hectares.
(7,400 acres) 85 The law also permitted the government to regulate what was
produced on private farms; for example, it could decide that a cattle ranch
should produce sorghum.86 Chávez had some justification in attempting to
redistribute land: in 1997 the bottom 75 percent of Venezuelan landowners
possessed only 6 percent of the land, while the top 5 percent possessed
75 percent.87
Awash as it was in oil money, the government did promise to compensate
former owners of the land at market rates in the local currency, bolivares.88
Some foreign landowners, however, wanted compensation in dollars, as
consistently high inflation rates devalued the bolivar. Nor did landowners
want compensation in government bonds, whose value declined as inflation rose. There were also concerns because the Land Law stated that the
government was not obliged to pay landowners for investments they had
made in expropriated land.89
Exacerbating landowners’ concerns, officials began to question the legality of ownership of productive large estates so that they could expropriate
them even if they were not idle,90 claiming that these properties were actually
state-owned.91 Indeed, in 2004 Chávez declared a “war on big landowners.”92
Despite court rulings forbidding it, he encouraged landless Venezuelans to
invade large landholdings even before the legality of expropriation had been
determined.93 The constitutional reform proposals of 2007 contained clauses
that would have seriously undermined the right to own property: despite
the proposals’ defeat Chávez later instituted many of them by decree.94 The
83.
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result was many occupations and takeovers of property, including of large
estates previously protected as long as their land was not idle. Thus, many
of these “rescued” lands were not paid for, as they were considered to have
been left idle or not legally acquired in the first place.95
The frequently extra-legal and arbitrary expropriations caused chaos in
the commercial farming and ranching sectors. As early as 2001 the Venezuelan Cattle Ranchers Association reported that 139 farms had been invaded,
although the government claimed the figure was an exaggeration.96 By 2010,
the government had reportedly seized between 5 million97 and 7.5 million
acres of farmland98 out of a total of about 67 million acres considered suitable
for cultivation,99 or 7.5 to 11 percent of Venezuela’s total cultivable land. In
late 2011, the Venezuelan Supreme Court ruled that it was not necessary to
enforce the criminal code against people occupying private land, arguing
that “above private rights are those rights for the common good destined to
the production of food or other products for human consumption.”100
Yet it does not appear that redistribution of land to small farmers increased
the food supply. Any Venezuelan head of household or young person could
apply for land, seemingly regardless of whether he or she was an experienced
farmer.101 But government assistance was disorganized and the new peasants
often had trouble getting credit to buy seed.102 The result appears to have
been a severe drop in the absolute amount of food produced in Venezuela.
Carlos Machado, an agricultural expert, calculated that from 2004 to 2012
rice production fell by 34 percent, cattle production by 27 percent, and
maize production by 25 percent.103 Reliance on imported food rose from
64 percent of food in 1998,104 to 75 percent in 2005,105 and to 90 percent
in 2012. Another agricultural expert, Alejandro Gutierrez, noted that during
the period 2003 to 2011 Venezuela imported agricultural products in which
it had previously been self-sufficient, such as beef, rice, and maize, while
its food exports declined by 93 percent from 1998 to 2011.106
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Aside from weather problems, public policy measures that caused this
decline in productivity were insecurity of land tenure and fear of expropriation; lack of investment in infrastructure; scarcity of inputs; and lower prices
paid to producers.107 Yet figures from the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), comparing 2011 to 1999 show increased production in such staples
as milk, rice, maize, and chicken.108 These FAO figures, however, might have
resulted from use of unreliable figures produced by the national Venezuelan
government, figures which might have been deliberately rigged, especially
by over-calculating production on expropriated land.109
Chávez not only attacked the property rights of landowners and other
food producers, he also attacked the property rights of wholesale and retail
distributors. During the early years of his rule, he was able to use Venezuela’s enormous oil earnings to provide state-subsidized food to the poor.
However, the unpredictable nature of these earnings meant that he was not
always able to subsidize food as much as he wished. Chávez then began
to blame the market economy, claiming that price-gougers and hoarders
were responsible for the high price of food. Increasingly, he used the slogan
“exprópiese!” (“expropriate it”), proposing that expropriations would release
food supplies and lower their price.
By 2010, Chávez had nationalized almost 400 businesses, although these
were not only in food110; many of these nationalized industries underutilized
their capacity, went into debt, and produced less than they had under private owners.111 For example, the government owned half of the productive
capacity of pre-cooked maize flour but supplied only a fifth of the market112;
pre-cooked maize flour is the central ingredient of Venezuela’s staple food,
the arepa. Although he had promised to pay market prices for nationalized
industries, Chávez began to renege on these promises as his expenditures
on other parts of the economy outstripped his revenues from oil.
Faced with price controls and threats to imprison those who violated
them,113 private businesspeople withdrew from food production and distribution, as they could not afford to produce or sell at the prices Chávez
had decreed. In early 2010, Chávez closed down hundreds of stores for
“speculation,” and seized a French supermarket chain.114 In May 2010, forty
107.
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110.
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butchers were detained and some strip-searched on the grounds that they
were driving up beef prices; the result was that many butchers stopped selling beef entirely.115 In 2012, dairy products and coffee, both produced on
farms that had been nationalized, were in extremely short supply: Venezuela
had even begun importing coffee, which it had exported until 2009.116 High
inflation rates raised the costs of inputs for food producers, yet price controls
meant that they could not raise the prices at which they sold, driving some
producers out of business.
Unsurprisingly, the government had to spend more money on food
imports as the local food supply shrank. Nor did the state properly manage these imports: in June 2010, the government admitted that 30,000 tons
of food was rotting on the docks, although opposition media claimed the
figure was 75,000 tons.117 In January 2013, it was reported that imported
goods were delayed for an average of forty-five days at the docks before
they could be distributed; this might have been in part because many of
the general managers at the ports were members of the military,118 some of
whom demanded bribes before they would release the food. Another reason
for delays was corruption on the part of importers in cooperation with those
who managed the ports; the longer the delays, the more they could demand
more foreign currency to import and sell more items.119 Delays, wastage,
and sale of controlled food on the black market might help explain why, for
example, from 2006 to 2012, grain imports from neighboring Latin American countries increased by 375 percent.120 Yet the government’s response to
shortages was often to blame private producers for hoarding (which some
may have done) rather than to rectify inefficiencies in production, storage,
and transportation of food, inefficiencies sometime caused by corruption or
the granting of monopolies.
VI. Macro-Economic Policies: Undermining Food Security
The statistical data above on reduced rates of malnutrition and undernourishment suggest improved distribution of food to the poor at least during
115.
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the first few years of Chávez’ rule, despite his undermining of the property
rights of those who produced and sold it. Thus at least in the short term,
Chávez’ populist policies were successful in fulfilling Venezuelans’ right to
food. This also suggests that violations of civil and political rights do not
necessarily mean concomitant violation of economic human rights, at least
in the short term. Redistributive (quasi) socialist policies can be implemented
without civil and political liberties.
However, such short-term improvements in the human right to food
undermined Venezuelans’ longer-term food security. Chávez relied heavily
on earnings from Venezuela’s oil exports to subsidize imports of food, as
internal production and distribution declined. If Chávez mismanaged possibly
temporary profits from the oil economy, then the investments necessary to
sustain Venezuela’s economy—including its long-term food security—might
be at risk. Even if the profits were not temporary and oil retained its high
price over the long term, mismanagement of other aspects of the economy
could undermine the usefulness of oil rents.
Chávez used profits from the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, which
had been nationalized in 1976 by an earlier government, to finance food
imports as well as his health, education and food missions. As of 2002, the
PDVSA was required to release at least 10 percent of its annual investment for
social spending121; for example, in 2006, it was responsible for $13.3 billion
in social spending, or 7.3 percent of GDP.122 In 2012, it donated $15.5 billion
directly to the National Development Fund (Fondo de desarollo nacional:
FONDEN) and spent another $28 billion on social development, adding up
to about a quarter of its reported earnings.123 Such spending might be justified if use of oil funds did not cause underinvestment in the oil company,
but money that might have been used to pay PDVSA employees, to maintain
its equipment, and for reinvestment was instead diverted to social projects.
The state takeover of the PDVSA resulted in some inefficiency and mismanagement, as Chávez often appointed military officers, his own family
members and his political supporters to take charge of PDVSA and of other
important economic assets, regardless of whether they were qualified for
their positions. The PDVSA suffered from loss of technical capacity and the
problem of having to satisfy a “growing web of political patronage.”124 By
2013 PDVSA had cut its production from a planned 5.8 million barrels per
day to between 2.8 and 3 million barrels.125 An explosion at an important
refinery in August 2012, killing at least forty-two people, showed how the
PDVSA was deteriorating.126
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Chávez appeared to regard Venezuelan oil as a personal asset that he
could use as he saw fit to promote his policies and political agenda. He sold
1 million barrels of oil a day at subsidized prices either in Venezuela or to
allied countries.127 This was not necessarily a sound economic decision, as
he could have sold the subsidized oil at higher prices on the international
market and used the profits to invest in Venezuela’s future. In 2012 the
price of oil for Venezuelans was only 1.6 cents a liter,128 yet this was partly
a subsidy to wealthier Venezuelans, who were far more likely to own cars
than the poor.
Chávez also used oil to help like-minded Latin American states. He sent
90,000 barrels per day to Cuba in return for 30,000 doctors and other specialists.129 Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and ten other Caribbean states
signed an accord with Venezuela in 2005 allowing them to pay 40 percent of
their oil debts over twenty-five years in either cash or food such as bananas,
sugar, or rice.130 Oil from Venezuela also helped support Nicaragua, one of
the poorest countries in the Americas and one in which the business and
investment communities were still treated with suspicion.131 Indeed, through
the PDVSA-owned American retailer, CITGO, Chávez even supplied cheap
fuel to several poverty-stricken areas in the United States, undoubtedly to
point out the iniquity of poverty in his imperialist enemy132: this generous
subsidy to Americans was stopped in 2009 when the Venezuelan economy
began to unravel.133 The provision of oil that was almost free to Venezuelans
and at very cheap prices to political allies, combined with reduced production at PDVSA because of mismanagement, meant that by 2013 Venezuela
faced a hard currency shortage and could not import enough food.134
Much of the money that Chávez requisitioned from PDVSA was invested
in FONDEN, an agency that he used to finance his missions. At least during
the early years of his tenure, Chávez personally controlled FONDEN, rather
than allocating its funds to the various ministries in charge of social services,
creating, as it were, a “parallel state.”135 Neither professional bureaucrats nor
anyone else knew exactly how Chávez spent FONDEN’s monies; FONDEN
was unaudited and disbursal of its funds not subject to normal oversight or
127.
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decision making.136 Neither the criteria for citizens’ access to benefits nor
the rules for allocation of resources were clear.137 It was also not possible to
ascertain whether later on transparent or accountable budgeting procedures
were instituted for the missions: the government was “reluctant” to release
information on mission programs, including the food mission.138
Control of FONDEN was the reason that Chávez could announce
grandiose projects, many of which would then lie dormant or incomplete.
Between 2005 and the end of 2012, FONDEN received $56.9 billion from
the PDVSA and another $45.3 billion from the Central Bank,139 enormous
amounts which were under Chávez’ personal control. The “off -balancesheet spending”140 enabled Chávez to distribute food and other goods to
his supporters and withhold it from his opponents and detractors. Despite
his control of FONDEN, however, Chávez still did not have enough money
to finance the missions, and he began to look for new sources of funds in
the later years of his presidency. Starting around 2008, he began to borrow
funds from China in exchange for oil at low prices. By 2013, these loans
were in the range of $46.5 billion over the preceding four years.141
Chávez also increased the number of people employed by the state, thus
removing some people from poverty while also ensuring his own popular
support. By 2009, public sector employment had doubled to 2 million
people.142 This is a standard populist measure that can become economically unsustainable in the longer term and was only sustainable in Venezuela
because of the country’s oil wealth. Some of these new jobs were given to
people who were not competent to do their duties, as in the case of political
or patronage appointments to the PDVSA.
Whatever Chávez’ attempts to improve access to food were, they were
undermined by extremely high levels of inflation during the second half
of his rule. This inflation was caused in part by devaluation of the bolivar.
During the first few years of Chávez’ tenure, the bolivar was overvalued relative to foreign currencies. This encouraged imports of food that would have
been more expensive if the bolivar had not been over-valued; indeed, it was
often cheaper to import food than to produce it locally, discouraging local
production.143 This over-valued currency permitted imports of protein-rich
foods such as chicken, improving Venezuelans’ diet during this period, even
136.
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though domestic food production simultaneously declined.144 From 2003 on,
however, the government devalued the bolivar five times.145 Imported food
was now more expensive, so less was brought in; this was exacerbated by
the requirement that importers apply for allocations of foreign exchange from
the government, some food importers having to wait three to six months
for import permits.146 Company managers would queue for days hoping to
receive a foreign exchange allocation, then give up and reduce imports.147
At the same time, the changes in property relations discussed above
meant that less food was being distributed internally. The result was the
classic definition of inflation, “too much money chasing too few goods;” in
this case, the scarce goods included food. The food price level index, an
index of the price of food relative to the price of a generic consumption
basket in the US in 2011, rose from 2.15 in 2000 to 4.06 in 2013.148 Chávez
tried to encourage more food imports by introducing dual exchange rates
for essential (food) and non-essential goods; for example, to buy essential
goods in May 2010 one dollar cost 2.6 bolivars, whereas for non-essential
goods one dollar cost 4.3 bolivars.149 The official rate rose to 6.3 bolivars
per dollar in February 2012 for essential goods, and a higher rate for nonessential transactions.150 These dual exchange rates facilitated currency
manipulation, as some private businesses used the opportunity to import
food at the lower exchange rate and then sell as if they had imported at the
higher exchange rate.
In an attempt to counteract inflation during the run-up to the 2012
elections, Chávez announced controls on almost 100 new food and other
essential products. However, because both food imports and internal distribution had been reduced, the one because of devaluation and the other
because of expropriations and price controls, the sporadic food shortages
that had been occurring since 2007 became quite severe. Between 2007 and
2013, more and more shops offered fewer and fewer goods for sale. While
the cost in money of controlled foods might have been very low, the cost
in time to obtain food was severe as consumers spent long hours in lines
searching for food at different Mercals in their neighborhoods.
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Finally, corruption contributed to economic mismanagement. Chávez’
personalist and nepotistic governing style meant that he appointed family
members, friends from his days in the military, and political allies not only
to senior positions in government but also to senior management jobs in
the industries that he nationalized, as well as in the previously-nationalized
PDVSA. Corruption and nepotism resulted in mismanagement and underproduction, which resulted in fewer exports and fewer dollar earnings
that could be used to buy food: underproduction at food-producing and
processing facilities also resulted in less food both for the Mercals and the
open markets. As an example of nepotism, one banker originally close to
Chávez was granted a monopoly to supply staple foods to the Mercals, thus
presumably charging more than would have been the price had there been
some competition among suppliers.151 Transparency International, an anticorruption NGO, consistently ranked Venezuela as one of the most corrupt
nations in the world. In 2013, it was ranked 160th of 177 countries: in this
corruption perception index, the higher the number, the more corrupt the
country is perceived to be.152 Even if individual appointees were not corrupt,
their incompetence adversely affected the food supply.
VII. Chávez: An Incompetent Steward of the Right to Food
If one looks at the three aspects of the right to food, to respect, protect,
and fulfill it, then Chávez’ record is mixed. He did respect the right to
food, which was originally one of his top priorities. He attempted to fulfill
citizens’ right to food by instituting Mercals, free food distribution, school
feeding programs, and price controls. Moreover, whatever their defects, his
policies may have two positive long-run effects. Economically, his health,
education, and food distribution policies might have improved Venezuela’s
human capital, as his Ambassador to the US noted in 2006: “Although some
critics have called these programs [the missions] clientelistic, they are simply
responding to long-ignored needs and building much-needed human capital
in Venezuela.”153 For example, programs providing school meals meant that
children would be better able to learn: this may have long-run positive effects if and when Venezuela returns to a more orthodox market economy.
Politically, Chávez made it difficult for future leaders to ignore the poor.
Nevertheless, Chávez’ short-term fulfillment of nutritional needs came
at the expense of citizens’ longer-term food security; in effect, he did not
protect the right to food. In a 2004 speech at the United Nations, Chávez
151.
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spoke of food security as a goal of his Bolivarian revolution,154 yet far from
increasing the amount of food available, nationalizations and price controls
undermined food production and distribution. The inflationary pressures
caused by economic mismanagement priced much food out of reach of
ordinary Venezuelans, while mismanagement at the ports meant imported
food was delayed and sometimes rotted. Expropriation and redistribution of
land resulted in a decline in food production. Under-pricing and bartering
of oil rather than selling it on the world market undermined Venezuela’s
long-term capacity to protect the right to food because fewer funds were
available for imports. And the clientelistic distribution of food to supporters over opponents meant that individual food security became a relatively
scarce political good.
Chávez was an incompetent steward of his country’s economic future,
wasting oil resources, expropriating food producers without planning how
to replace them, and driving food distributors out of business by imposing
unrealistic price controls. Venezuela would have been better off had Chávez
respected property rights and the market while continuing to subsidize food
for those who needed it. But statistics do not indicate that in the short run
the people of Venezuela suffered severely from food shortages; certainly,
there were no reports of starvation or of severely high rates of malnutrition.
Moreover, many of the errors in planning, management, and distribution
that Chávez made had also been made by preceding regimes that relied
heavily on oil revenue, suffered from high inflation rates, and instituted
price controls.155 Chávez is distinguished mainly by his focus on the poor
(albeit more on his perceived supporters among the poor) and by his attack
on private property. The former is laudable: the latter economically unwise.
Chávez’ populist platform was to provide resources for the poor—including food—to which they had previously not had access. Yet he sacrificed
the long-term economic health of Venezuela and with it long term food
security, to achieve his short-term goals. The support he received in the
2012 elections, despite food shortages, was in part because many people
believed that he cared about them in a way that his predecessors had not.
The fact that before that election the opposition had to assure voters that
they would continue the missions—albeit with more efficiency and accountability—may indicate that politics in Venezuela had changed for the better
for the long run.156
On the other hand, Venezuelans continued to face food shortages after
Chávez’ death as his successor, Nicolás Maduro, continued his policies,
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imposing price controls on fifty more items in early 2013.157 The twelvemonth inflation rate skyrocketed to 35 percent per year by June 2013,158
while the price of food rose by 72.1 percent between October 2012 and
October 2013,159 partly as a result of continued devaluation of the bolivar
but also as a result of food scarcities. Rice, coffee, and beef, previously
produced inside the country, now arrived from other countries.160 Maduro
spent much of his time making deals with other Latin American countries to
import food from them, but this food often rotted as ships could not unload
at congested, inefficiently-run ports.161
Spontaneous technological inventions arose among the population to
help people find food. Mobile apps were developed to provide information
about what goods were available where,162 while a website was developed to
provide information about the real (black-market), as opposed to the official
exchange rate: Maduro responded by ordering the arrest of the individuals
maintaining the exchange-rate website.163 When not blaming the shortages
on an imperialist, CIA-led conspiracy, Maduro explained them away by focusing on “over-consumption” by Venezuelans.164 He also blamed shortages
on a deliberate campaign of sabotage by food producers and distributors,
ordering government agents to “raid” private companies’ warehouses for
allegedly hoarded food. The private producers responded that much of the
hoarded food was simply what was needed to produce finished goods. Difficulties in obtaining government permission to buy dollars also meant that
the largest food company in Venezuela, Empresas Polar, could not import
enough inputs for processed food such as the pre-cooked flour for arepas.165
Meanwhile, smugglers were selling price-controlled food over the border in
Colombia, exacerbating the food shortages.166
Ironically, just as food shortages worsened, Maduro accepted an award
from the FAO for Venezuela’s success in reducing malnutrition.167 While this
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success was real, it was due in large part to Venezuela’s oil revenues and to
general and unsustainable mismanagement of the economy. If Venezuelan
mothers could not find milk for their children, as was happening in 2014, then
malnutrition could rise in the not-so-distant future. Indeed, in early August
2013 forecasters were predicting a long-term decline in food consumption
by 7.5 percent by 2017.168 In 2013 the cost of food rose by 74 percent.169
Maduro’s insistent continuation of Chávez’ economic policies did not bode
well for Venezuelans’ future human right to food. In early 2014, there were
large anti-Maduro demonstrations in the streets of Caracas protesting food
shortages among other problems, and three people had been killed.170
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